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Abstract: About eighty-two per cent of online Indonesians are younger generation. Online realm 
for this generation is a space for the quest of individuation, socialization, and of its piety. This 
research-based article investigates the religious expressions in this realm. The research adopted 
mixed methods including online survey. However, the data interpretation and the fi nal report remain 
qualitative. The fi nding suggested the complexity and multiple directions of religious expressions 
that also indicated the intersection of a number of issues such as the evasion of religious authority, 
conservatism, imagination of pluralistic society, and the transnational religious phenomenon. 
Keywords: Indonesian cyberspace, millennial generation, religious expression
Abstrak: Sekitar 82 persen orang Indonesia yang aktif di internet adalah kaum muda. Dunia online 
bagi mereka adalah ruang untuk individualisasi, sosialisasi, dan ekspresi kesalehan. Makalah ini adalah 
penelisikan berdasarkan penelitian tentang ekspresi keagamaan di internet bagi generasi millenial. 
Penelitian ini mengadopsi metode campuran termasuk survei online. Namun, interpretasi data dan 
laporan akhir tetap bersifat kualitatif. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan kompleksitas dan beragamnya 
ekspresi keagamaan yang juga menunjukkan tumpang tindihnya isu seperti pengelakan terhadap otoritas 
agama, konservatisme, bayangan akan masyarakat majemuk, dan gejala keagamaan transnasional. 
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Decades ago, “Western” scholars might 
argue that technology and modernization 
facilitate the process heading to secular 
world and in consequence domesticated 
religion within the privatized domain 
(Bruce, 2001, p. 87). Nowadays, scholars 
testify that the reversing is somewhat true in 
which those are formative for the comeback 
of religion to the centre stage. The returned 
of religion in the public visibility coincided 
with process of the deprivatization of 
religion and the emergence of religious 
fundamentalism (Casanova, 1994; Marty 
& Appleby, 1994; Berger, 1999). Religious 
fundamentalism might be the “unintended 
side effect” of such process that taps upon 
growing technologized, networked and risky 
society (Castells, 2004, p. 12–35; Beck, 
1992; Beck, 2009). While deprivatizing 
of religion might be accelerated by 
the internet, in the case of religious 
fundamentalism, internet became the arena 
for “reinforcing” religious “boundary” 
in order to fi xate in what Castells termed 
“the exclusion of the excluders by the 
excluded” (Castells, 2004, p. 9). Indeed, 
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religious fundamentalism is not the only 
sign of the age as there are multiple shifts 
in the present day world, including the 
emergence of spiritualism (as a category 
overlapping, but not exclusively with the 
sphere of religion), ethno-nationalism, neo-
national tribalized society (James, 2006, 
p. 13) and secularism, markedly with the 
growing “non-religious affi liated” category 
in a number of survey in the “Western” 
countries, such as the United States 
(Burke, 2015; Lipka, 2015). Technological 
achievement on the other hand, brought up 
new “enchantment” not totally different 
from “religious enchantment”, a “non-
deist cult” that brings the “ecstasy of 
communication” (Breton, 2010). The 
claim made by Jim Gilliam, “the internet 
is my religion” epitomized this condition 
(Gilliam, 2015). Thus, we witness in the 
present globalized world the overlapping, 
cross currents categories and metaphors 
between technology and religion, the issue 
partly taken in the present article.
Internet and social media (hereafter, 
“socmed”) have grown exponentially to the 
point that speaking about the impact of them 
upon human lives is probably a cliché. Among 
two hundred and fi fty million Indonesians, there 
are around eighty-two million of them online 
(Kominfo, 2014). Indonesian youngsters 
occupied 82.8% -the largest portion- of the 
Indonesian internet users (APJII & Puskakom 
UI, 2015, p. 12). The penetration of mobile 
device is even more impressive as it exceeds 
Indonesia’s population (We Are Social, 2015). 
This impressive fi gure however, could not 
deceive the reality of digital divides, the “zone 
of silence” (Castells, 2002, p. 247ff.; Potter, 
2006; Lupac & Sladek, 2008) that seriously 
challenged the rhetoric of the pervasiveness of 
internet and gender equality, despite numerous 
initiatives, both by the government and non-
government institutions to increase larger 
exposure of internet among the Indonesians. 
To this segment, having a small-fry technology 
is luxurious. The most populous island but 
the smallest among the big fi ve islands in 
Indonesia, Java Island is remains the highest 
rate of internet penetration. This is only a 
confi rmation of the longer times criticism to 
the unequal development between Java Island 
and the rest of the country (30 ribu, 2015). 
In spite of the fact that research on 
the relationship between religion and 
internet is legion (e.g. Brasher, 2001; Bunt, 
2003; Ciolek, 2004; Dawson & Cowan, 
2004; Højsgaard & Warburg, 2005), the 
investigation of Indonesian religious 
discourse in internet is still in infancy 
(see Merlyna Lim in 2005, 2012, 2013; 
Ardhianto, 2014). Not much even the 
investigation of young people perception 
on religious issues if not neglected outright 
in the larger discussion of religion in 
Indonesia. If there are some, then those 
more a refl ection of the adult imaginaries 
and/or of the industrial interests 
(Priyandana, 2014; Wahidin, Effendi, & 
Shaleh, 2015). An irony, as this group is the 
largest population in the Indonesian online 
landscape.
This article focuses on the religious 
discourse among the youth, in particular 
Indonesian millennials generation. As the 
research, which the basis of this article is an 
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experiment, a trial and error and admittedly 
encountered a number of discrepancies, 
especially the broad scope of the issue 
at hand and the size of population of the 
subject the conclusion is open for further 
scrutiny and debate.
METHODS
Researching Religious e-Xpression
The present article is based on a 
research that is part of a collaborative 
research umbrella, conducted by the Inter-
Religious Studies (IRS), Universitas Gadjah 
Mada Graduate School. The umbrella 
title of the research is “The Exploration 
of the Inter-Generational Perception and 
the Concept of Religious Plurality” that 
won the 2015 competitive research grants, 
organized by Universitas Gadjah Mada 
Graduate School. The research cluster is 
consisted of three inter-related researches, 
i.e. (1) “The Evolution of Religious Plurality 
Discourse in Indonesia”; (2) “The Study 
of Religious Plurality Social Practices in 
Three Generations in Yogyakarta”; and (3) 
“The Study of the Dynamics of Religious 
Plurality in Social Media and Internet among 
the Millennials”. This article is written on 
and a contemplation upon the third research 
project on the religious plurality discourse 
among the millennials. The research team for 
this section included two research assistants, 
Fazlul Rahman, M.A. and Hendrikus Paulus 
Kaunang, M.A. Both are from the IRS.
The material object of the research is 
the millennials generation in which some 
others called it “Generation Y”. In general, it 
includes any people that were born between 
1980s and 1990s. We follow Pew Research 
Center’s classifi cation, which identify the 
millennials as young people who were born 
between 1981-1997 (Fry, 2015). In terms 
of digital technology exposure, it may also 
be called “Digital Native” generation -as 
against the older generation that belong 
to “Digital Migrants” (Palfrey & Gasser, 
2008; but see also the critiques of Thomas, 
2011; Shah & Jansen, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; 
Hertz, 2012). The researchers admit that 
all those generation identifi cations are a 
refl ection of the United States and European 
demographic arrangement; hence the team 
takes a freer position on this and adopted 
the term “millennials” simply to push the 
comparative advantage. Basically, the 
Indonesian millennials are between the age 
of 18 and 34 in 2015. This is a generation 
who has come of age in the transition era 
between the New Order and Reformation 
(1998 onward), in a world of technological 
pervasion, of globalization, and of the 
period of the politicization of identity.
The research is conducted within the 
period of May to August 2015 and employed 
mixed methods, viz. online survey, semi-
structured interview, literature study, focus 
group discussion (FGD), online observation, 
and meme collection. The team interviewed 
twelve sources (both the millennials and 
non-millennials), conducted three focus 
group discussions, observing a number 
of websites, blogs, Twitter and Facebook 
messages, walls and pages, which including 
two community forums, eleven Facebook 
fan and fi gure pages, two online petition 
websites, and twenty websites and blogs; 
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collecting twenty-six relevant memes; and 
lastly conducting an online survey, which 
recorded 432 responses, 343 of them are 
the millennials. 
The process of selecting websites 
and blogs is a combination of random 
searching (based on Google searching) 
through the entry terms such as, pluralisme 
agama (religion plurality), perdamaian 
agama (religion peace), kemajemukan 
agama (religion diversity), and konfl ik 
agama (religion confl ict), and the link 
suggestions -as the outcome of initial 
search and/or the information or suggestion 
by certain subjects or resources and/or by 
circumstantial observation. 
The semi-structured interview was 
conducted in order to gain deeper insight on 
the issue at hand. The twelve interviewees 
were resided in Yogyakarta, Ruteng, Jakarta, 
and Melbourne (Australia), which consisted 
of fi ve non-millennials and seven millennials, 
ages spanned between 26 and 48 years old; 
two females and ten males. The occupations 
of the interviewees are teacher, lecturer, 
activist, pastor, worker, writer, entrepreneur, 
and student. In terms of religious affi liation, 
eight of them are Muslims, one Catholic, one 
Protestant, one Hindu, and one non-affi liated. 
Most of them are internet and socmed activists, 
while two of them are less active but their 
positions in educational fi eld, nonetheless, 
allowing them to enhance the understanding 
of religiosity among the millennials. 
FGD is taken to gather a larger opinion 
from the millennials. Two FGDs were 
organized in Yogyakarta among the students, 
social activists, and employees and one in 
Lumajang among the students of a pondok 
pesantren. Altogether the FGDs garnered 22 
respondents, all of them were millennials. 
The online survey allows for a larger 
data gathering and helps to create a pattern 
from the intended subject (the selected 
outcome of the survey is available in the 
Figures). This engagement is an experiment 
that was conducted in order to look the 
possibility of data gathering based on the 
“six degrees of separation” through the 
network of personal acquaintance. It was 
carried out between June 8 and August 4 
2015. The research team employed Google 
Forms engine. The survey is divided into 
three parts that is consisted of fi fteen 
questions related to online activities, 
twenty-two questions related to religiosity 
and religious expression and eight general 
and informatory questions. Specifi cally, in 
the religious affi liation item, the plan was 
adding three additional boxes besides the 
six recognized religions in Indonesia (viz. 
Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism), i.e. aliran 
kepercayaan (spiritual movements), “non-
religious affi liated”, and “other” religions. 
Figure 1 Religious Affi liation 
Source: Author
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Figure 2 Inter-Religious Interaction
Source: Author
As a matter of fact, during the process 
of data collection the research team 
encountered two incidents: a repulsive 
meme sent to one of the respondents, and 
a survey site blocking, assumingly both 
initiated by the party who disagree with 
this online survey. This incident however, 
might say something about the complexity 
and sensitivity of the case at hand, that 
there is some section of Indonesian society 
that allergic to the issue of “religious 
plurality” qua “pluralism”, as seemingly 
this survey perceived. “Pluralism” for 
some Indonesians connote to “secularism”, 
“liberalism”, and “religious relativism” 
(Yusuf, 2012).
The expectation of larger participation 
was failed, as the data gathered is minimum 
and hardly refl ecting the population of 
Indonesian millennials. An explanation 
is put forward regarding this outcome, by 
one of the interviewee whom he remarked 
that the foursquare term such of “religion” 
is not a favourite topic for the youngsters. 
Any religious issue, he concluded, should 
appear in youth sub-culture appearance. 
Lesson to learn: it is deem important to 
understand specifi c cultural marker, cultural 
context, and even the social imagination of 
the research subjects.
DISCUSSION
Cyberspace and Young People
“Internet”, “cyberspace”, and 
“cybersphere” in this discussion could 
be seen in discursive way as it refers to 
arena of producing, consuming, creating, 
and establishing the agency position and 
self-production. It oftentimes connotes 
to “online”, “wired”, and “virtual” 
realms, as contrast to the “offl ine” and 
the “meatspace”. Since William Gibson 
coined the term cyberspace in his novel, 
Neuromancer (1984) -a neologism of 
cybernetics and space, it popularized and 
associated with a number of activities 
through the prefi x cyber- to create a 
sensation of “advanced”: cyberpunk, 
cybersex, cyberethics, cyberterrorism, and 
others. This term is referring to the virtual 
activity -for instance in the novel Gibson 
wrote about cyberspace as disembodied 
consciousness in consensual hallucination 
(Gibson, 2000 [1984], 262)- and referring 
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to the factual activities in the internet 
(Strate, 1999, p. 383). This broad defi nition 
is employ in this article in order to smooth 
the discussion on the relationship between 
the human and digital technology, in 
particular in Indonesian context. Indonesia 
is still in the progress to increase the internet 
penetration, hence presumably the contrast 
between digital and non-digital realms -the 
combination that is called by Lindgren as 
“hyper media world” (Lindgren, Dahlberg-
Grundberg & Johanson, 2014)- is still 
prevailed. 
Cybersphere as a working terminology 
might be owed to the notion of “public 
sphere”, an all-pervasive term that mainly 
imagined as a “middle-earth” between the 
state and society, as envisioned by Habermas 
(1989). The notion has been criticized 
for its presumption of the liberal public 
sphere and for its projection as the place of 
consensus, of public opinion (Fuchs, 2013, 
p. 181-182; Gitlin, 1998; Mendieta, 2011). 
In the context of cybersphere the consensus 
is depended upon on what a sociologist 
called plausibility structure (Berger, 1967, 
p. 16-17) or in socmed, trending. Trending 
as a “plausibility structure” musters people 
or group of people into a “consensus” upon 
certain topic within certain period of time, 
or if certain topic ripe for exposé as an 
expression of public anxiety. This trending 
is constantly changing and moving from 
one topic to another. All in all cybersphere 
is a complex place that far from becoming 
a place of steady consensus and more a 
hodgepodge of disperse motivations, of 
consensus as to resistance, as a place for 
representation, as of representation, and 
the “safest place” for hiding the human 
motivation.
Web 2.0 platform and social media 
are widely believed as the latest upshot of 
digital technology revolution, an e-ruption 
that bring with it new paradigm of digital 
practice by put humanity at the centre of 
digital constellation (O’Reilly, 2005; Fraser 
& Dutta, 2008). This claim however, does 
not go unchallenged, as a critique revealed 
that those merely new model of internet 
capitalism rather than radical shift of 
technological achievement (Fuchs, 2013). 
The new paradigm nonetheless, persisted, 
as it “harnessing creativity and collective 
intelligence” and enhances the interactivity 
between the user and technology to the 
point of altering the meaning of identity, 
reality, and even humanity (Fraser & Dutta, 
2008).
Internet arguably gives a signifi cant 
incentive for the expansion of the youth 
culture. Youngsters often charged as people 
who are disconnected with reality and 
living in the virtual bubble, as contended 
by some of the interviewees and FGD’s 
participants. However, the present research 
reporting a more complex picture in which 
many Indonesian youngsters displayed 
sensitivity in a number socio-political 
issues, though in diverse outlets and though 
some of them extremely peculiar, as can be 
seen in the following part.
As the survey in this research project 
indicated, Facebook and Twitter remained 
the “traditional” and popular social media 
over the others, as it concurred in the 
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present research. Mobile technology, 
coupled with instant messaging and socmed 
applications broaden the dimension of 
digital technology implementation. Line, 
Whatsapp, and Path gave this young people 
privatized version of public space where 
they are safely establishing congregation 
with their selected fellows. Facebook on 
the other hand helps to distinguish the 
social self in the online world from other 
internet activities. The recent research 
demonstrated that many Indonesian 
Facebookers do not know that they are 
doing internet (Mirani, 2015). Facebook 
is more socializing then “internet” since it 
apparently gives an “intense engagement 
and emotional enjoyment” (Magid, 2012; 
Mauri, Cipresso, Balgera, Villamira & 
Riva, 2011). After all, there is a truth in an 
observation that “Indonesians are a very 
social and ‘chatty’” people (Pramuadji, 
2014).
Youth culture is perceived as the 
culture that cultivates experimentation, 
creativity, playfulness, and adventure 
(Fraser&Dutta, 2008; Magid, 2012; Mauri, 
Cipresso, Balgera, Villamira & Riva, 2011). 
Youth culture is also displayed a tendency 
to create “rhizomatic networking” that 
evades existing hierarchy (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 189–191). Along with it 
there is a condition in which Deleuze and 
Guattari called disconnected becomings: 
a realm that is “... carried out in such a 
way that it becomes imperceptible itself, 
asignifying, makes its rupture, its own 
line of fl ight, follows ‘aparallel evolution’ 
through the end” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 11). The disconnected becoming 
implies to the independence of a self from 
the “traditional” structure. Paradoxically, 
since hitch onto the internet world in 
some cases is also adopting “citizenship” 
and/or “membership” in the interest of 
forging social self and creating a sense 
of “community”, hence escaping from 
hierarchy does not mean total individuation: 
it may rather adopting heterarchy setting 
in which the subscription to and sources 
of authority come from different venues. 
This may determine the religious discourse 
consumption and production patterns, as 
we shall see below. 
All things considered, the youth could 
be seen as a “prosumer”, producer and 
consumer simultaneously, and as suggested 
by Willis, in the “active consumption as 
a kind of production” (Willis in White & 
Wyn, 2008, p. 212, 216). The research 
also demonstrated that even though many 
of the millennials “exist” in almost all 
socmed, i.e. the “traditional” socmed such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ and the 
newest one such as Path, Instagram, Line, it 
does not mean they preoccupied with them 
and keep adding friends in all those media. 
During the course of time, they exercised 
a degree of self-regulation as they active 
only in selective media, while maintained 
the accounts on the rest.
Besides those potentials, a number 
of reports pointed out the fl ip side of 
internet and socmed for young people 
(e.g. Hollauf, 2015; Lanier, 2010). Digital 
addiction (pornographic, gambling, cartoon 
websites), excessive video game playing, 
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chat-obsessed behaviour, cyber-bullying/-
harassment, marginalizing people, and the 
latest is radicalized youngsters through 
cyber jihad (see the following part), 
those often attributed to this generation 
and became a serious concern for the 
government, parents, school, and religious 
authorities (White & Wyn, 2008, p. 
221). Sharing status, often “oversharing” 
details of personal life is common in the 
social media. Other observations further 
pointed out the diffi culties young people 
individuating their self in the socmed. 
Many of them suffered what is called 
“duck syndrome”, “A duck appears to glide 
calmly across the water, while beneath the 
surface it frantically, relentlessly paddles” 
(Scelfo, 2015). They presented the best 
face in socmed regardless their inner 
struggling. They have to present the most 
“optimal” self in the hyperpersonality and 
impersonality mode (Walther, 1996).
The Millennials’ Religious e-Xpression in 
Cyberspace
There are numerous examples of 
Indonesian youth experimentation of 
creativities in the cyberspace such as the 
establishment of Indonesian-native socmed 
(sebangsa) a mobile app for 2014 general 
and presidential election (pemiluapps) and 
others. The playground of the youth is also 
considered a digression, a diversion that 
questioning social structure, government, 
ideology, market, and all “establishments”, 
including the religious presumptions (Rifkin, 
2014, p. 304). A witty meme might refl ect this 
playfulness through which it blurs religious 
identity. The context is lebaran (Indonesian 
eid al-fi tr celebration): “At last arrived in 
[my] hometown. ‘You said you couldn’t fi nd 
ticket?’ ‘I was ushered by Santa Claus, mom” 
“Akhirnya tiba juga di kampung. ‘katanya 
kehabisan tiket mudik?’ ‘saya menumpang 
Sinterklas, bu’”. Cyberspace allows such 
cultural production.
In the last few years, there are new 
phenomena on public opinion gathering in 
the internet through comments in socmed, 
meme, and online petition. The latter is 
becoming a mouthpiece for public opinion 
toward certain fi gures or socio-political body 
such as the government, political parties, 
companies, and educational institutions. 
The millennials are also active in this 
public opinion gathering and displaying the 
development of their political awareness 
and social sensitivity upon social and 
religious issues. For instance, we collecting 
such petitions by the millennials regarding 
the issues of such as women police hijab 
uniform (“Cabut larangan jilbab bagi 
Polwan”), church demolition (“Hentikan 
Pembongkaran Gereja di Pangkep”), 
Rohingya Muslims (“Selamatkan Etnis 
Rohingya”), religion and citizenship 
(“Penghapusan Kolom Agama dari Kartu 
Tanda Penduduk”). Indeed, political 
awareness and sensitivities displayed 
through the aforementioned examples are 
associated with ideological and religious 
position. In this case, however, cyberspace 
is a place for the young people mobilizing 
their socio-political awareness in which the 
offl ine realm hardly provides. 
The online survey confi rmed the digital 
divide as earlier mentioned. Java Island 
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occupied 86.5% of respondents, while 
the rest is 11,4% (outside Java Island), 
and 2% (abroad) respectively. Prominent 
discrepancy we encountered along the 
way was the population outreached for 
the online survey. Aforementioned, the 
Indonesian millennials occupied 82.8% 
of internet users. We found that our 
respondents were not only too few to 
represent the spectrum of millennials, it is 
also tended to belong to certain persuasion, 
which apparently more favourable 
toward the notion of “religious plurality”. 
Religious minority (non-Muslims) tends to 
support the notion of “religious plurality” 
though there were signifi cant numbers who 
support it among the Muslims. There was 
limited representation from the sceptical 
and opposition camps.
In term of religious affi liation beyond 
the six recognized religions, evidently, 
3.5% (12 respondents out of 343) fi lled 
the narrow paths of non-religious affi liated 
and spiritual movements. Out of six of 
non-affi liated two styled themselves as 
“atheists” and “agnostics”. This fi gure 
hardly representational but tells us about 
a shift taken place among the younger 
generation that some of them increasingly 
disaffected with the organized religions. 
Furthermore, since affi liation to religion 
does not always correlate with the piety 
and religious activities, we can expect the 
“spiral of silence” at work, that is the silence 
opposition against the dominant discourse 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974). However, it is 
simply undetected in the research fi nding. 
Spiral of silence and self-censorship also 
at work when many of the internet users 
were on different relative position from the 
majority (Islam). An interviewee from a 
religious minority group contended, “as a 
minority … [I] have to be very careful to 
create a statement, [so as to] avoid trouble 
… minorities seek common interest with the 
majority so [s/he] wouldn’t marginalized”. 
Another observation in this regard shown 
that religious-based representation in the 
Indonesian cyberspace is imbalanced, 
minority in the offl ine realm tended to be a 
minority in the online realm as well. 
Most of the respondents supporting 
to the idea of religious plurality, e.g. inter-
religious dialogue (95%), inter-religious 
friendship (97.2%), holiday greeting to 
other religion (83.1%), and so on. The state 
slogan “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” as the exact 
term or by connotation appeared several 
times in the discussion and online survey. 
However, pursuing further the notion we 
found a more complicated and nuance 
positions. The following sample fi gures 
are suggestive: opposition to the inter-
religious marriage (43.7%), support to the 
state pressure toward religious “dissidents” 
(54.2%), and harsh measures to the religious 
defamation (24.7%). The last two, while 
showed a different degree of understanding 
of religious plurality, is probably also 
telling about the social imagination on 
the “stronger state”, rather than being 
simply an “intolerant” stance. Apparently, 
for them, coercive measure is necessary 
to maintain order. After the falling of the 
New Order, Indonesia underwent diffi cult 
transition that weakened the foundations of 
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state authority. Another fi gure, i.e. almost 
60% of the respondents agree with the 
implementation of Law No. 11/2008 on 
the Information and Electronic Transaction 
Law (renowned as UU ITE) upon the issue 
of religious defamation -12.5% among 
them gave a stronger support. It can be 
expected that within this ambient the inter-
religious tension might be sowing. 
UU ITE that was established in 2008 is 
meant to protect electronic and information 
exchange, mostly in the internet. Despite 
its noble objective, it has unintended side 
effects since it also being used for the cases 
of religious defamation or blasphemy in the 
internet, especially through the article 27/3 
and 28/2 of the law. The law stretched its 
history to the New Order administration when 
in 1970s it established a discourse of SARA 
(“suku, agama, ras, aliran” -ethnicities, 
religions, races, and socio-political streams) 
as a tool for the state, through the law and 
security enforcements to maintain social order 
and stability. The “collateral damages” of this 
discourse are well recorded as suppressive acts 
against the “dissidents” were mounted and the 
meaning of accepted religious expression were 
defi ned. This ambiguity might give a complex 
perception on religious plurality in the present 
context -demonstrated the strong legacy of 
the New Order- as the implementation toward 
any opinion and initiatives put forward in the 
internet that considered a threat to social order 
and national unity. Theoretically speaking it 
could silent the religious “dissident” view in 
the internet, such as atheism, agnosticism, and 
religious minority. This opinion coupled with 
the support of the implementation UU ITE 
on the case of religious defamation shown an 
ambiguity. 
The above case shown that there are 
different level of understanding and awareness 
of “religious plurality”, nonetheless there is a 
social imagination of “the muscular state”, 
in which masculinity and strong hand to 
maintain social order and integrity is invested. 
If this observation is acceptable then this is not 
only to confi rm the increasing intolerance in 
the internet (be it induced by the millennials 
or not) but also a refl ection of the defi cient of 
the state administration on managing social 
order, stability, and diversity. Masculinity, as 
earlier argument already touch upon, might be 
contributed by the imagery of the New Order’s 
strong administration, in particular epitomized 
in the fi gure of General Suharto, as manifested 
in the popular meme and poster, taking him as 
a desirable nostalgic leader: piye kabare, isih 
penak jamanku to [“How are you? My day 
is much better, right?”]. An interview with a 
respondent revealed further the interplay of 
the millennials’ social imagination and the 
state’s. 
The government is less active [and] “dares” 
to subdue the radicals, who deviate from the 
core of the accepted religions in Indonesia. 
Radicalism that is heading toward terrorism, 
and radicalism that heading toward separatism 
(the two are existed but the former get more 
attention because of the work of Densus 88 [the 
counter-terrorism unit belong to the National 
Police] should be taken seriously through the 
solid intelligence works. The state security is 
crucial for all of us. If the state safe and secure 
[from the agitation] then [everybody] could 
observe [each religion] and work peacefully. 
(personal communication, n.d)
In certain case, masculinity is an 
important element for the formation of 
individuation and identity for a (male) 
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youngster and this quality is evolved in 
distinct way from the above imagination of 
the state, though probably to a degree there 
is a contribution of that imagination as well. 
This is apparent in the case of the emergence 
of Indonesian young jihadists that recruited 
by some groups, including ISIS/ISIL, 
through socmed such as Facebook, as 
spotted by Noor Huda Ismail, an observer 
of radical Islamism in two interviews. The 
imageries of jihadists holding AK-47 in 
Facebook cover photos for instance, might 
induce the impression of gallantry, cool and 
dashing for other young jihadists. Those are 
converged with Islamic messages that give 
these youngsters religious meaning and 
passion, such as, “live a noble life or die as 
a martyr” (ish kariman aw mut shahidan) 
(Ismail, 2015). The new jihadists adore 
the veterans of Afghanistan and Mindanao 
wars as their new heroes (Toohey, 2014). 
Many of them spend almost a full-time 
life behind the laptop, in the socmed and 
internet, as to the cyberspace is the only 
vehicle to become social and the place to 
invigorate their religious presupposition. 
An Indonesian sociologist even confi dently 
claimed that among the “fundamentalist” 
religionists, internet is the most powerful 
tools for their existence. While internet 
and its constellations produced within 
the “Western” logic of advancement and 
modernity -something might contradict to 
the core value of this group- the adoption 
of it for the group ideological end refl ecting 
the Manuel Castells’ observation that the 
member of this group “… building of 
defensive identity in the terms of dominant 
institutions/ideologies, reversing the value 
judgment while reinforcing the boundary” 
(Castells, 2004, p. 9). On the other hand, 
the recruitment through the socmed is 
illustrating the rhizomic condition in which 
multiplication of social subjects is not 
depended upon traditional genealogies and 
authorities, as the meaning production and 
authority association are independents and 
determined in the privatized space. 
Comparable example in different 
setting is the Nazism sympathizer youngster 
in a blog (http://alifrafi kkhan.blogspot.
co.id/). Historically speaking, Nazism once 
became a source of the state muscularity 
in the formative days of Indonesian 
nationalism in 1920s, up until the post-
independence period. The emergence of 
the short-lived Indonesian Facist Party 
(Wilson, 2008), the term “Gestapu” for the 
1965 putsch (Hadler, 2004, p. 306-307), 
might connote to the German masculinity. 
Furthermore, Ben Anderson recalled the 
day when he was a journalist in 1963 
and surprised by the fi rst president of 
Indonesia, Sukarno, of his speech that 
adoring Hitler as an exemplary statesman 
(Anderson, 1998, pp. 1-2). The emergence 
of youngsters who crazed with the Nazi 
heroism might partially explained with the 
aforementioned masculinity as an element 
of their individuation formation, and at the 
same time paralleled with their religious 
aspiration, as the site also discussing about 
the connection of some Nazi fi gures with 
Islam and Muslims in Palestine. At this 
juncture, there are a number of intersecting 
concerns besides the above issues, which 
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including the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, 
which is among the heated issues nowadays 
among some Muslims. The presence of this 
blog might be an indication a way of some 
millennials involved with international 
political conversation, regardless in a 
questionable way.
Socmed has been contorted as the 
place for investing emotional attainment 
by expressing their feeling, in many ways 
unrestrained. The process of mimetic, 
argued by one interviewee explained the 
limited rational choice and attitude in this 
milieu. The internet is not the place, as the 
observation conclude, to broaden the view 
toward the Other and tended to confi rm the 
preconceived belief toward other religions; 
it is simply amplifying the “echo chamber” 
effect. Mirroring and amplifi cation of 
contention are also the feature of this mode 
of interaction, such as the emergence of 
Facebook fan pages, Muslim Defence 
League (MDL Indonesian chapter) and 
the Indonesian Christian Defence League 
as its competitor. Both pages mutually 
developing negative images of the rival 
religion. This condition further pronounced 
when inter-religious polemics surfaced, 
triggered by cases such as hijab ban in the 
high schools in Bali Island (a Hindu enclave 
island), religious conversion of some 
celebrities -both the Christians and the 
Muslims celebrities, and other cases. These 
kinds of incidents are easily triggered the 
infl ammatory, tweetwar, word exchanges, 
and memes in socmed and internet. 
Religious polemic especially among the 
Abrahamic religious traditions has a long 
history. The millennials are just following 
the traditional pattern of it; only the media 
of expression are changing. Polemical 
tendency in the religious cyberspace 
further accentuated the stereotypical 
imagery of the other, through which 
religious conservatism provided an easy 
and accessible exposition to handle certain 
religious issues. This position oftentimes 
less interested in the discourse of religious 
plurality if not stands against it. However, 
it is interesting how this conservatism is 
handled by the millennials. 
Kartun Muslimah, a Facebook fan page, 
is an interesting case where it presumably 
ran by Muslim girls that promote Islamic 
values. In term of religious position this 
page is devoted to the most conservative 
precepts, e.g. on the issues of youngsters 
dating, gender relations, and others. It does 
not hide their anti-western position, in 
which oftentimes associated to Christianity. 
In many ways, this is an example of a 
reclaiming and seizing Islamic portion of 
public space or seizing the public space for 
Islam. Interestingly, the way it presented 
is very much within the youth sub-culture, 
including the play on visualization of 
the messages. The fact that the page is 
ran by Muslim girls and intended to the 
specifi c “market” of young Muslim women 
demonstrated a complex presentation of 
religious self while following a distinct 
religious imagination. An example of this 
is its creation of jargon such as “high-
quality jomblo”, a high quality dateless is 
certainly a counter narrative of modern life 
in which pre-marital dating and free-sex 
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is common among Indonesian youngsters. 
The fan page strongly promoted non-dating 
marriage through which an Islamic ideal 
is invested. The employment of cartoon 
(as the name of the page implied), meme, 
attractive visualization, humour, and up-to-
date slang/lingo among the youngsters such 
as “jomblo” (dateless) showed multiple 
belonging of the Muslims self and distinct 
way this millennials engaged with religious 
and social problems. However, its strong 
conservatism fl avour prevented it to engage 
with inter-religious discourse.
The new media, internet and other 
digital technological products, notably 
mobile communication devices, and 
its utilization such as the above Kartun 
Muslimah represented a new emerging 
Muslim youths, especially the urbanites 
and the middle class, who do not see the 
discrepancy between being religious 
and embracing modernity. Religion 
and modernity are seen as equally 
attractive (Heryanto, 2014, p. 24ff.). This, 
presumably is not exclusively Muslim 
phenomenon but to a lesser degree also 
obvious among the young people in other 
religions, notably the Christians. It is even 
safe to say that in much earlier period, it 
was some Indonesian Christians that found 
fi rm ground on embracing media and 
digital technology in mobilizing religious 
aspiration, especially through the adoption 
of American televangelism sub-culture 
(Coleman, 2000, p. 185ff.). 
This part concludes with an interesting 
example of a cross-confessional initiative, 
Teman Ahok to support a public fi gure in 
which the meaning of religious authority is 
reinterpret in a distinct way. Teman Ahok 
is a group of Jakarta-based youngsters 
(22-24 years old) that concerned with the 
promotion of Basuki Cahaya Purnama, 
known by his popular nickname Ahok, the 
present governor of the Special Province of 
the Capital Jakarta, for the 2017 governorate 
election. This is an inter-confessional and 
non-partisan group that created a website, 
Facebook page and Twitter account, and 
YouTube for this campaign. Importantly, 
Ahok is ethnically Chinese and a devout 
Christian. It is an irony that Ahok became 
the governor for the region where once was 
the most inhabitable place for Indonesian 
Chinese when a huge riot happened during 
the last days of General Suharto seventeen 
years ago. Renowned for the stern position 
against rampant corruption and lazy 
management, fi rstly in his native district in 
Belitung Island, later on in Jakarta Capital 
Region as Vice Governor, and presently 
the governor, Ahok gained genuine support 
from the wide range elements of society, 
even across religious persuasions. Just to 
be expected, his position drew criticism 
from other segments, and signifi cantly from 
some Muslim elements, basically on the 
ground of his religious identifi cation. Until 
recently, he became the constant target of 
black campaigns and other image damaging 
activities by his political opponents and 
anti-Christian and Chinese elements. 
Among many arguments to reject 
Ahok leadership, the most popular was 
based on Qur’anic passages, one of them is 
from Surā Al-Mā ’ida 51:18:
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You who believe, do not take the Jews and 
Christians as allies: they are allies only to 
each other. Anyone who takes them, as an ally 
becomes one of them -God does not guide 
such wrongdoers. (Qur’anic translation is 
from M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (2004)).
Offi cial Indonesian translation of this 
passage is translating allies (awliyā ’) as 
“leaders” (“pemimpin”). Non-Muslim, i.e. the 
Jews and Christians are seen as unbelievers 
(kufur) hence among the popular opinion 
barred from becoming a leader among the 
Muslim population. There is a complex 
Islamic opinion on the possibility of non-
Muslim political leadership upon Muslim 
population, and here the space limited to 
discuss it (see the discussion in Sahal, 2012). 
The interesting thing is that Muslims and non-
Muslims millennials aware of this religious 
debate, do not overlook it but do not take it as 
a catch-22 either. They on the other hand elude 
the normative restriction, induced by religious 
authority, and moving to another morally 
equivalent to that religious imagination: 
struggle for the social justice. In the case of 
Jakarta, the imagination of social justice is 
invested upon the shoulder of a non-Muslim 
leadership. 
One Facebook comment posted in 
Teman Ahok fan page is suggestive. A 
presumably a male youngster, called him 
Valdex, he remarked:
If in Islam it is forbidden and sinful for taking 
non-Muslims (kafi r, “unbelievers”) as a leader 
[of a nation] … then I am ready to take that 
burden [of sin] from my God. The important 
thing is that I surrender [my trust] to Brother 
Ahok [Koh Ahok] in Jakarta, if necessary 
I surrender [my trust] to Brother Ahok for 
Indonesian [president] … so that Indonesian 
future is brighter, and my descendants do not 
suffer of being born in Indonesia because of 
the corrupters … Greet Indonesia free from 
corruption.
Valdex is taking the risk of “violating” 
the traditional understanding of the 
aforementioned Qur’anic passage, and 
trading it for something he perceived 
as a larger good. At this point he did not 
challenge the religious authority -he 
accepted the burden of the sin- but simply 
imagining a better Indonesia, in which 
free from corruption. This imagination is 
clearly not only does not contradict with 
Islamic precepts but in fact along with 
religious position against the corruption. 
Indonesian Muslim authorities such as 
Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI -Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia) have produced religious 
instruction (fatwa) to combat corruption.
CONCLUSION
Indonesian millennials present complex 
faces, and as expected offers no coherent 
picture. The polemical feature on religious 
issue apparently strong and these youngsters 
became the forefront of religious conservatism, 
oftentimes became the mouthpiece of the 
established religious authority. Nevertheless, 
they also present religious issue in a more 
engaging manner, with its playful element, 
even crossing the traditional gender boundary. 
The harm side is that some youths became 
radicalized in seeking their manhood. While 
many millennials are sharing with many 
conservative idea of religion, but the way of 
drawing the boundary and belonging is more 
dynamic. 
As argued by Heriyanto, the emergence 
of young Muslim eloquence -I would like 
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to extend this thesis to Christian youths as 
well- in digital technology is not necessarily 
challenges the establishment per se, though 
indeed it challenged it in the way religious 
message should contextually presented for 
a layer of Indonesian young population. It 
is, on contrary created another variant of 
Islam and Islamicization process within 
Indonesian society (Heryanto, 2014, p. 32). 
Digital technology in this sense gives a way 
for a new form of religiosity rather than 
challenging the old one. 
The commodifi cation of human 
“experience” by media and commercial 
also provide another dimension on the 
millennials understanding of religiosity 
and on the religious plurality. Pentecostal 
(and Charismatic) form of Christianity 
has no diffi culty to embrace new media, 
including many forms of digital technology 
product to enhance their messages and in 
turn embracing youth culture into their 
religious system. This “experiential” 
primacy of religiosity is more fi tting to the 
youth culture and became an alternative 
to another form of religiosity that put the 
primacy on rational affi rmation. 
Socmed and internet have been a 
vehicle for some millennials to augment 
their sensitivity to social and religious issues. 
The inter-religious and religious plurality 
discourse framed beyond formality and 
abstraction by some Indonesian millennials 
through this kind of social engagement 
rather than in discursive level within the 
institutional and academic walls. Indeed, 
to them the better future of Indonesia is 
depending upon.
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